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status is largely antiquated.
From such a philosophy it also follows that Mr. Carson would, as
he has in Chapter 44 on Interrogation, Investigation and Preparation
and elsewhere, scotch the hitherto frequently voiced exhortation that
a lawyer should always seek to bring about a reconcilation. The
author renders astute advice when he suggests that even a psychiatrist should not undertake "working out" a discordant marriage when
only one spouse is his patient. Mr. Carson elsewhere recognizes the
duality of the contributions to domestic friction. For example, he
says of Lundberg and Farnhan's Modern Woman, The Lost Sex
(p. 319 n.3): "The whole book is worth reading, but it discusses
the shortcomings of women only, and does not go very far into the
shortcomings of men."
No one can seriously dispute the reality of the fact that today,
at least in Florida, divorce may be obtained virtually by real consent,
and that in almost all of those comparatively few cases in which
there is ostensible non-consent the resistance to divorce is offered
solely for the purpose of securing an advantage in the disposition
of property and, to a lesser extent, in obtaining custody of children.
It is probable that, particularly with reference to the disposition
of property, there remains a strong tendency to re-invoke fault concepts. All this Mr. Carson makes evident. Nowhere, however, is
there a suggestion that an easier, less hypocritical, and less expensive
technique might ultimately be evolved, as for example a specialized
and adequately staffed tribunal. But maybe that's a little steep for
a successful Florida divorce practitioner to suggest, let alone to
embrace.
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SuPRnum CoTmrT. By Paul A. Freund. Boston:

Little, Brown and Company. 1949. Pp. vii, 130. $3.00.
Professor Freund's study of the Supreme Court is in no respect a
great book, but it is an excellent small one; it comes as a conservative
affirmation of what Holmes called the profession of thought, and it
provides a tentative Ivy-Leagued murmur of dissent to the taunt of
Socrates that of growth and uprightness and independence the lawyer
is wanting (p. 78). Especially is it a relief fron those prevalent hints,
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tracts, and tomes on how to win friends either by saving them taxes
or by giving them something for nothing, as the case may be. It
properly rejects the tendencies of some writers (a) to make the study
of the Court a field day for gossip; (b) to place into two and one-half
categories, conservative, liberal, and swing men, the nine young or
old - Roosevelt or pre-Roosevelt - justices; or (c) to regard the Court
as a poorly coordinated baseball team that can best be understood
through the use of boxscores containing the hits, runs, and errors as
called by the author-umpires according to their personal predispositions.
Yet, despite these saving virtues, the book fails to develop any
standard, technical or policy, by which we can measure what the
Court does or ought to do. And - which is worse to my mind - the
author, a professor at Harvard Law School and a former assistant to
the Solicitor General, fails to tell us what he really thinks. In short,
these three essays, originally delivered as lectures at Northwestern
University under the auspices of the Rosenthal Foundation, do not
quite succeed in giving us an understanding of either the Court or
the author.
There is nonetheless much to be said for the book. Professor Freund
has a classic style. His quotations, though partial to Shakespeare, include Plato, Kipling, the New Testament, Swift, T. H. Huxley, and
Epictetus-via-Toynbee; they neither hinder the reader in his enjoyment of the exposition nor give rise to suggestions of Barlett's Familiar
Quotations. Conversely, in clear, almost brittle, language Professor
Freund describes what he compares to a play: plot, character, and supporting roles.
The plot is a discussion of recent opinions. Three ideas struck me
as particularly noteworthy. One indicates the rather general acceptance
by the justices of the notion that rights of the mind and of expression
are of greater constitutional significance than property rights, and
asks, through apt quotation of Judge Learned Hand, whether this
view should not be modified so as to recognize that rights to property
are an integral part of the personal rights of the citizens of any community that is to endure. The second is a clear recognition of the
doctrine of federalism- the now often discarded delineation of the
respective spheres of action of the Federal Government and of the
state governments, as prescribed by the Constitution- together with
an awareness that not all of the justices treat this concept as the
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predominant determinate in the decision-making process. The third
is an almost eloquent projection of the passive versus active liberties,
search and seizure versus free speech.
For Character the author has chosen Brandeis, for whom he was
a clerk. He tells of the Justice's demand for procedural safeguards,
his recognition of federalism, his respect for the Court as an institution, and his distaste for expediency. In this study there is perhaps
too much emphasis on the alleged necessity for a lack of sentimentality
in a good judge. If character is needed, then temperament is important;
instinct and experience assist when logic leads astray.
The final chapter, Supporting Roles, is a recognition of the lawyer's
function in constitutional litigation. It contains a chess-like description
of the behavior of counsel in the TVA and Holding Company cases.
It is his profound distaste of sentimentality that apparently restrains
Professor Freund from committing himself. Not even against the more
recent trend in the search and seizure cases does he utter a real
yell.' Although he has a kind word to say for those who occasionally
display a sense of outrage, at no time does he mount the soap box
to fight In re Yamashita2 or any other salient example of Court failure.
Yet this may be unfair criticism, for it attacks a premise: Professor
Freund's phrase is that we need "... a bias against bias against bias"
(p. 42). And it is true that too many mistake for righteous indignation
what I presume the author means by sentimentality.
We sorely need more works of this sort - accurate and enjoyable
discussions of vital legal subjects. Without question, Professor Freund
has written one of the few books of genuine merit on the Court. It
deserves wide reading. But it remains an excellent exposition rather
than a dynamic suggestion.

J.

ALLEN SmrE
Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Florida

'True, the Court decided United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950),
subsequent to the publication of the book.
2327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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